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Few would question the importance of the role played by France in the integration of 
Western Europe but there is little agreement over French motives, nor over whether those 
motives were the same for each decision taken to surrender sovereignty over the entire 
postwar period. It is sometimes forgotten, particularly in Britain, that the question of 
European integration has been a deeply divisive one in France, cutting across political 
parties, the Administration and sectoral interests. The Treaty of Maastricht was accepted 
by the most slender of majorities – 51 per cent of those who voted in the 1992 
referendum. The disagreement in explaining French policy towards European integration 
stems partly from the difficulties which historians face in gaining access to the official 
record, particularly under the Fifth Republic, and partly from differences in interpretation 
of that record. But the disagreement is also due to debates conducted mainly within the 
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political science and international relations literature about the causes of European 
integration in general.  
Taking the postwar period as a whole several questions have so far dominated 
discussions about France. Firstly, why, despite the success of their system of national 
economic planning, did the French agree to adopt the liberal framework of the European 
Economic Community? Secondly, why did they not agree to integrate defence? Thirdly, 
why was it that de Gaulle, the arch-opponent of supranationalism, was responsible for the 
most supranational of policies, the Common Agricultural Policy? And finally, why did 
the French agree to Economic and Monetary Union with its restrictive Growth and 
Stability Pact, rather than retain the flexibility of the European Monetary System? The 
debate in the literature, simplified here for heuristic purposes, is between those who argue 
that France’s interest in European integration has been driven by the geopolitical 
imperative of reconciliation and co-existence with Germany1 and those who claim that its 
primary purpose was to advance France’s domestic policy choices, however they were 
defined.2 Integration once under way was then extended either through a process of 
institutional spill-over3 or through inter-governmental bargaining in which economic and 
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commercial interests had priority.4 
The three books discussed here, all written by non-historians, contribute either 
directly or indirectly to this debate. Indeed Craig Parsons sets out to extend the 
parameters of the debate by reviving an early interpretation of French policy towards 
European integration – namely the role of the pro-community ideas held by key policy-
makers in France. Parsons’ central claim is that not only do ideas matter in politics but 
that each of the key decisions taken by French governments to surrender a degree of 
sovereignty, namely, the decisions to form the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), was taken primarily because of the 
pro-community ideas held by some of the policy-making elite at critical junctures. How 
this elite interpreted French interests was, he claims, quite removed from any definition 
of their objective position. To prove his thesis Parsons, unusually for a political scientist, 
dips into the French archives (almost entirely those in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 
draws upon a formidable range of secondary literature and conducts extensive interviews 
with politicians and high-ranking civil servants. What emerges is a picture of French 
leaders with considerable freedom to choose and implement their European strategies due 
to the difficulty which political parties had in elaborating coherent positions, and to the 
lack of information given and hence of interest shown by voters in European issues at 
major elections. On each occasion when the French leaders chose to surrender 
sovereignty (and on the occasion of the European Defence Community when they chose 
not to), Parsons, displaying a mastery of the literature, examines the alternatives open to 
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them in considerable detail. These alternatives he classifies as a traditional defence of the 
institutional status quo, or broad intergovernmental cooperation. 
Starting with Schuman’s proposal in 1950 to create a European Coal and Steel 
Community, Parsons shows that there was some support for all three alternative 
arrangements and that Schuman ‘could equally well have constructed support for 
confederal or traditional stances’ but ‘took a leap in the dark towards his interpretation of 
French interests’ (p.66). Yet, as Parsons himself acknowledges, neither the traditional nor 
the confederal policies which had been tried in the period 1945-49 had succeeded in 
delivering what the French most needed, as defined in the national plan. This was 
guaranteed access to the coal and coke resources of the Ruhr on which the expansion of 
the French steel industry depended and on which, by extension, the future 
competitiveness of the French economy was seen to rest.5 Neither Robert Schuman nor 
Jean Monnet, the head of the Commissariat au Plan, author of the Schuman Plan and 
acknowledged ‘Father of Europe’ proposed a pro-community policy until after all other 
options had been exhausted.  
Why did France sign the Treaty of Rome setting up the EEC? For Parsons it was 
firstly because the pro-community conservative Antoine Pinay, French foreign minister at 
the time of the Messina negotiations in June 1955, ignored his government’s instructions 
to reject a common market, and secondly because his model of a desirable Europe was 
shared by the subsequent Socialist Prime Minister Guy Mollet, as well as by key advisers 
such as Maurice Faure and Robert Marjolin.  
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Parsons ignores, because it does not fit his argument, the fact that the pro-
community Mollet proposed in mid-1956 the formation of an Imperial customs union 
composed of the French Union and the British Empire, in order to keep France out of the 
common market with Germany.6 When that option was closed by the British Cabinet 
France faced the choice of economic autarchy, with or without the rest of the French 
Union, participation in a free trade area under British terms, or continuing to negotiate an 
acceptable deal within an Economic Community of the Six. Parsons’ argument that it was 
pro-community ideas rather than the promotion of French economic interests which 
explained the French government’s choice of the EEC is not convincing. Even the 
skeptical de Gaulle had to accept that the terms negotiated in the Treaty of Rome served 
France’s economic interest.7  
Parsons’ belief in the supremacy of pro-community ideas as the driving force in 
French decision-making towards Europe creates difficulties for him in explaining the 
French rejection of the EDC. Castigating those historians who ignore the EDC8 or 
misinterpret it9 for committing ‘one of the most important errors underlying the common 
dismissal of ideas in EU history’ (p.68), Parsons argues that the EDC ‘came very close to 
succeeding’. Indeed, had it succeeded, ‘Europe would have taken a giant leap towards 
political unity, perhaps establishing the common foreign and security policy that still 
eludes the EU today’ (p.89). It could be argued that what the EDC episode does confirm 
is that when a pro-community policy emerged in France in response to an external 
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pressure (American insistence on German rearmament) rather than to a domestic policy 
choice, it did not succeed. 
If the failed attempt to integrate defence raises difficult issues, even more 
problematical for Parsons’ thesis is the success of the CAP thanks to a leader who held 
decidedly anti-community ideas. Parsons explains de Gaulle’s support for the CAP as 
serving de Gaulle’s own very different ideas about Europe. It was no more than a means 
to an end. When his European policy failed, ‘this institutionally structured strategy had 
become so embedded in international demands and vested domestic interests that even de 
Gaulle could do little to change it’ (p.142). Parsons chooses not even to discuss the 
counter-argument that de Gaulle’s support for the CAP may have been an end in itself.10   
In analyzing the two most recent extensions of integration, the Single European 
Act and Economic and Monetary Union, Parsons enters largely undocumented territory.11 
Believing that ‘the broad pattern of French mobilization on European issues in the 1970s 
followed the lines that gelled in the 1950s’ (p.156), he sets out to test his ideational 
theory against the competing theories based on defence of France’s domestic policy 
choices or geopolitical concerns. As against claims that the Single European Act was a 
response to earlier failures of policy to deal with growing economic interdependence, he 
claims that the standard response to greater interdependence would have been greater 
liberalization. The reason why the French chose institution-building rather than greater 
liberalization was that they had a ‘pro-community leader’ (Mitterrand) who stood out 
from his coalitional support (p.179). Mitterrand is also credited with securing support for 
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EMU in France. ‘French pursuit of full EMU was decided personally by Mitterrand, over 
objections from some of his closest allies and advisors’ (p.203). This view is shared by 
David Howarth in The French Road to European Monetary Union. In a detailed analysis 
of the causes of the French decision to support EMU, based on interviews with French 
politicians and officials as well as a wide range of secondary literature, Howarth agrees 
that ‘Mitterrand was central to the successful conclusion of a deal at Maastricht’ (p.142). 
Unlike Parsons, Howarth explains Mitterrand’s motives primarily in geopolitical terms. 
The French President hoped through monetary union to increase France’s power in 
relation to both Germany and the United States. In the words of Dyson and Featherstone, 
‘EMU was about rebalancing international and European monetary power in France’s 
favour’.12 On the question of whether in fact EMU would help France to achieve such an 
objective, neither economic theory nor the advice of the French financial administrative 
elite was unambiguous. As Parsons shows, a body of opinion, which included the French 
Finance Minister who negotiated EMU, preferred central bank coordination or a ‘parallel’ 
European currency (as promoted by Britain) to the delegation of monetary control to the 
European Central Bank. Many French elites saw the EMS and SEA themselves as causes 
of their monetary predicament. Indeed, divisions of opinion within the financial 
administrative elite are used by Howarth as evidence that Mitterrand’s decision to support 
EMU was taken to enhance French power rather than in response to economic realities or 
economic theory, and by Parsons to support his theory that Mitterrand’s actions can be 
explained by his pro-Community ideas. But apart from differing in their interpretation of 
his motives, both Howarth and Parsons agree on the key role played by Mitterrand in the 
                                                 
12
 Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht: negotiating economic and monetary 
union (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.62.  
 9 
EMU project. (Interestingly, Mitterrand is not even mentioned in Tommaso Padoa-
Schioppa’s insider account of the road to monetary union in Europe.13) They also share a 
common view of the divisions within French political parties and the administrative elite 
over French strategy towards Europe.  
These divisions play little part in Mairi MacLean, Economic Management and 
French Business from de Gaulle to Chirac. Concerned to explain how France moved 
away from economic protectionism to espouse liberalism and the values of corporate 
capitalism, MacLean emphasizes the common views and influence of the administrative 
elite. She describes the graduates of the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA) and of 
other Grandes Ecoles as coming from a ‘common mould’ and educated in a ‘common 
world view’ (p.71), and attributes French economic successes to the agreed ideological 
lines emanating from this institutional framework. Awkward questions such as whether 
interdependence or integration was the more appropriate framework for enabling French 
business to compete internationally, are carefully avoided. Implicitly, European 
integration is seen as serving the interests of French business. 
In fact the ideological struggle which MacLean analyzes concerns only two of the 
alternative institutional frameworks so cogently presented by Parsons. In doing so she fits 
into a long tradition of writing about France which focuses exlusively on the debate 
between the state and the market, between dirigisme and liberalism, between autarchy 
and free trade. How to fit European integration into that debate is a critical issue for those 
writing about postwar France. 
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